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GILMORE v. GILMORE: MODIFYING CHILD
CUSTODY AWARDS
James C. Kilbourne
I. INTRODUCTION
As the national divorce rate rises, the problems created by fam-
ily breakup are becoming more apparent to an increasing number
of Americans. The trauma that results from the abrupt end of the
marital relationship is often most visible in its effect on children of
the broken marriage.
No longer is custody of minor children awarded automatically
in a divorce proceeding. Until the last century, when a marriage
broke up the children of that marriage were always awarded to the
father. The courts treated the children as chattels to which the
father had an unquestioned right.' Courts gradually changed their
attitude and established the presumption that custody of children
of tender years should be awarded to the mother because of her
traditional role in child rearing.' Today, the courts hold paramount
the principle that neither parent has a prima facie right to the
child's custody. Instead, in awarding custody or in modifying a cus-
tody decree the court must look to the best interests of the child.'
The recent Montana case, Gilmore v. Gilmore,4 illustrates the
process used by the court in deciding whether a custody decree
should be modified. Although certain statutory presumptions upon
which Gilmore partially relied have since been repealed,5 that deci-
sion still has importance because the substantive common law prin-
ciples which it applied have been codified in Montana's newly effec-
tive Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act.'
II. GILMORE v. GILMORE
A. The Facts
In Gilmore, the father and mother had previously obtained a
divorce in North Dakota. As part of the divorce decree, the mother
1. Watson, The Children of Armageddon: Problems of Custody Following Divorce, 21
SYRACUSE L. REV. 55 (1969).
2. Id.; Note, Measuring the Child's Best Interests-A Study of Incomplete
Considerations, 44 DEN. L.J. 132, 134 (1967).
3. Podell, Peck, and First, Custody-To Which Parent?, 56 MAQ. L. REV. 51, 53 (1972)
[hereinafter cited as Podell]; Watson, supra note 1 at 56; Note, Measuring the Child's Best
Interests-A Study of Incomplete Considerations, supra note 2 at 133.
4. Gilmore v. Gilmore, - Mont. -, 530 P.2d 480 (1975).
5. REVISED CODES OF MONTANA, 1947 [hereinafter cited as R.C.M. 1947], § 95-4515
(repealed, effective July 1, 1975, LAWS OF MONTANA (1974), ch. 365, § 2).
6. R.C.M. 1947, §§ 48-332, 48-339.
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agreed to give custody of their three children to the father because
he was better able to care for them emotionally and financially.
Both mother and father subsequently moved to Montana.
At the time of this action, the father was employed at a salary
of $900 per month, working four days a week from 9:30 a.m. to 9:30
p.m. and Saturdays from 9:30 a.m. to 6:00 p.m. His children, aged
7, 5, and 3, were either in school, at a day care center, or with a baby
sitter when he was not at home. The mother had remarried, was four
months pregnant, and planned to quit her job. Her new husband
was employed at a monthly salary of $450. They were also purchas-
ing a new mobile home.
The father petitioned the Montana district court seeking affir-
mation of the North Dakota court's decree granting him custody
and control of the children. The mother counter-petitioned request-
ing the court to modify the decree to award her custody of the
children and reasonable child support. She sought the modification
based on an alleged substantial change in circumstances since the
original custody decree, specifying her remarriage which allowed her
to provide care and attention to the children, her return to emo-
tional health, and her children's need for their mother's attention
and care in a normal home life. The trial court, however, did not
find a substantial change in circumstances and held in the father's
favor.7
B. The Opinion
On appeal to the Montana supreme court, the mother cited the
case of Bayers v. Bayers' for two principles to guide the court in
deciding modification of custody decrees: (1) that the paramount
concern of the court is the welfare and best interests of the child,
and, (2) that a court may change a child custody decree only when
there is adequate cause arising out of changed circumstances. The
appellant argued there was a priority relationship between these two
principles, apparently trying to imply that substantial evidence of
the best interests of the child lessened the need for strong evidence
on the substantial change of circumstances issue. Although the su-
preme court did not make clear what was meant by such a "priority
relationship," it flatly rejected that notion. It held, instead, that
these two principles bore a "qualifying relation" to each other,9 but
it failed to clearly set out the qualification. What the court seemed
to say was that a petition for modification had to be predicated upon
7. Gilmore v. Gilmore, supra note 4 at 481.
8. Bayers v. Bayers, 129 Mont. 1, 281 P.2d 506, 508 (1955).
9. Gilmore v. Gilmore, supra note 4 at 481.
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a substantial change in circumstances from those existing at the
time of the original decree. '" This was the preliminary requirement
to any petition for modification. The substantial change in
circumstances could be a change in the mother's, the father's, or the
child's circumstances. The court would grant the modification only
if, in considering the changed circumstances, the best interests of
the child were served by a change in the custodial parent."
The appellant relied upon a similar change in circumstances in
the case of McCullough v. McCullough" as authority supporting her
contention that her change in circumstances was substantial. In
McCullough the mother had received neither legal custody nor
physical control of the child at the time of the divorce. In petitioning
for modification of the custody decree, the mother alleged her re-
marriage and her return to a normal emotional state as a substantial
change in circumstances. The district court found the changes sub-
stantial, modifying the original custody decree and awarding cus-
tody to the mother. The supreme court affirmed the lower court's
findings.
In the Gilmore opinion, the supreme court's treatment of the
McCullough case emphasized the importance of the district court's
ruling in a modification proceeding. Although the court said that
the Gilmore and McCullough cases could be distinguished on their
facts, it chose to rest its decision upon the finding that there was
substantial evidence to support the trial court's decision.' 3 Even
though the appellant-mother alleged there were similar changes in
the two cases, the supreme court found credible evidence to support
the trial court's decision that the changes in the Gilmore case were
not substantial.
The Gilmore decision took into account a factor not considered
in McCullough-a child's need for continuity in relationships. The
10. R.C.M. 1947, § 21-138 (repealed Jan. 1, 1976, LAWS OF MONTANA (1975), ch. 536, §
45) provided that the court shall have continuing jurisdiction after the divorce judgment to
vacate or modify the custody decree as it deemed necessary and proper. Some states hold
that the order granting custody is res judicata upon all circumstances existing at the time
the order was entered, whether or not the court was aware of them. Other states allow a
petition for modification of a custody decree based on material facts which were either
concealed from or unknown to the court at the time of the original award. Foster and Freed,
Child Custody (pt. 2), 39 N.Y.U. L. REV. 615, 624 (1964) [hereinafter cited as Foster (pt. 2)].
Montana case law, under the repealed statute, held that a custody decree was final upon
all conditions then existing. Trudgeon v. Trudgeon, 134 Mont. 174, 329 P.2d 225, 228 (1958).
See also, Svennungsen v. Svennungsen, - Mont. - , 527 P.2d 640, 642 (1974); Simon v.
Simon, 154 Mont. 193, 461 P.2d 851, 853 (1969). Under the UMDA, however, a petitioner may
seek modification of a custody decree based on facts that were unknown to the court at the
time of the entry of the prior decree, as well as facts that have arisen since that prior decree.
R.C.M. 1947, § 48-339(2).
11. Gilmore v. Gilmore, supra note 4 at 482.
12. McCullough v. McCullough, 159 Mont. 419, 498 P.2d 1189 (1972).
13. Gilmore v. Gilmore, supra note 4 at 482.
1976]
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respondent-father relied upon an earlier Montana decision that
stressed this need for continuity in relationships with the custodial
parent or party.1" In looking for evidence to support the trial court's
decision, the supreme court cited evidence of that very nature: the
fact that the children had lived with the father for over a year, and
the testimony of the social worker who investigated the parties'
home situations, concluding that the children were experiencing a
very satisfactory situation with the father. Citing In Re Biery, the
court said that the trial court must consider the ties of affection that
the child has formed, and the consequences of breaking those ties
in determining the best interests of the child."5
III. GUIDELINES FOR MODIFICATION
Since the Gilmore decision, the Uniform Marriage and Divorce
Act (UMDA), adopted by the Montana legislature in 1975,16 has
become effective. The UMDA not only changed procedural law and
statutory presumptions in custody proceedings, but also codified
much prior case law.
The UMDA, however, has not changed the four basic guidelines
that case law has established for the district court to follow in decid-
ing petitions for modification of custody decrees: (1) there must be
a substantial change in circumstances; (2) the court must look to
the facts and circumstances of each case; (3) the substantial change
must be measured against the child's welfare rather than the par-
ents' welfare; and, (4) the welfare and best interests of the child
must be the primary concern of the court.'7 Only upon a showing of
substantial change in circumstances which makes alteration of the
custody award in the best interests of the child may a court modify
the decree.
A. Substantial Change in Circumstances
A petitioner must show a substantial change in circumstances
of the parties in the action before the court will modify a custody
decree. Often, however, what might be considered a major change
in a person's life will not be viewed by the court as substantial. A
change in one party's situation (remarriage, for example) may, in
some instances, be ruled substantial while that same change in a
different party's situation may not. 8 The key to whether a change
14. In Re Biery 164 Mont. 353, 522 P.2d 1377, 1378 (1974).
15. Gilmore v. Gilmore, supra note 4 at 482.
16. R.C.M. 1947, §§ 48-301 et seq.
17. Simon v. Simon, supra note 10 at 854.
18. In McCullough v. McCullough, supra note 12 at 1191, the trial court viewed the
mother's remarriage as a substantial change in circumstances. In Gilmore v. Gilmore, supra
[Vol. 37
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is substantial is not just the nature of the particular changed cir-
cumstance, but also the context in which it occurs."
The factors which have influenced the court in determining the
substantiality of the changed circumstances are numerous. At vary-
ing times, the following factors have had an important bearing on
the outcome of the modification decision: the relative weight of the
claims of the mother and father as determined by statutory and
common law presumptions, by the divorce agreement, and by the
sex of the children; 0 the morals of the parties involved;2 the child's
wishes if he is of sufficient age to form an intelligent opinion;2 the
race, religion, and social views of the contesting parties;13 and the
parent's desire and ability to care for the child, including his or her
financial resources,24 remarriage,25 and ability to care for the child
as revealed by past conduct."
Montana law does not impose as a threshold requirement for
modification of a custody decree a showing that the person who
currently has custody of the child is an unfit person or has abused
the child.2" The supreme court has indicated in dicta, however, that
it would accept a showing of unfitness as an alternative for a show-
ing of changed circumstances.28 The petitioner would still be re-
quired to show that modification was also in the best interests of the
child, although that requirement would be more easily accom-
note 4 at 482, it did not.
19. CLARK, LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS § 17.4 at 584 (1968) [hereinafter cited as
CLARK].
20. Id. at 585.
21. Podell, supra note 3 at 66, stating, "the courts have repeatedly held that the per-
sonal life of a parent, whether illegal or immoral, provided it does not affect the ability to be
a parent and raise children, is not determinative in custody questions, for a person may be a
bad spouse or citizen without necessarily being a bad parent." (Emphasis added). The
UMDA adopts this view, providing "[T]he court shall not consider conduct of a proposed
custodian that does not affect his relationship to the child." UNIFORM MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE
ACT § 402 and Comment. In contrast, however, Montana's version of the UMDA omitted this
sentence.
In a June, 1976, Montana supreme court decision, the court held that the fact that a
parent allows her paramour to live with her for a short time before their marriage does not,
by itself, constitute a "change in circumstances" sufficient to support the granting of a
custodial modification order. Foss v. Leifer, - Mont. -_, 550 P.2d 1309, 1312 (1976).
Thus, the Montana supreme court could be adopting the philosophy of the sentence omitted
by the legislature.
22. R.C.M. 1947, § 48-332(2); Hurly v. Hurly, 147 Mont. 118, 411 P.2d 359, 361 (1966).
23. CLARK, supra note 19 at 588.
24. In Re Bourquin, 88 Mont. 118, 290 P. 250,.251 (1930); Watson, supra note 1 at 68.
The greater financial resources of one party are not necessarily a determinative factor.
25. Oberosler v. Oberosler, 128 Mont. 140, 272 P.2d 1005, 1007 (1954); CLARK, supra
notel9 at 601. Remarriage is not necessarily a determinative factor.
26. Cleverly v. Stone, 141 Mont. 204, 378 P.2d 653, 655 (1962).
27. Svennungsen v. Svennungsen, supra note 10 at 643.
28. Id.
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plished when there was a showing that the custodial parent was
unfit. Courts consider drunkenness, gross immorality, cruelty, neg-
lect, desertion, non-support, and conviction of a crime in determin-
ing whether a party is unfit.29
B. Best Interests of the Child
Statutes and case law have established that the best interests
of the child are to be the determinative factor in awarding custody. 0
Although a current statute provides that the father and mother of
an unmarried minor child are equally entitled to its custody, serv-
ices, and earnings,3' that right is not absolute, even though the
parents are fit and proper persons." Prior to the UMDA, when a
parent contested the custody decree, certain statutory presumptions
were applied. For example, when other factors between the parents
were equal, custody of a child of tender years was awarded to the
mother. If the child was at an age requiring preparation for educa-
tion or for labor, however, custody was awarded to the father.33
Presumptions like these have been criticized as being too rigid,
prohibiting thoughtful evaluation of the child's situation. 4 Courts
that awarded custody of young children to the mother because of her
traditional role in child-raising sometimes failed to consider many
mothers' post-divorce circumstances-circumstances in which they
usually had to assume all responsibilities for raising the children
and earning an income.35 There is a growing movement among
courts to abandon these presumptions, and to rely instead on the
testimony of social workers and experts in the field of human rela-
tions to determine what are the best interests of the child. 6
Experts in child behavior agree that the most important factor
in a child's development is his need for stability to develop a sense
of identity. "[Wihen a child is kept suspended, never quite know-
ing what will happen to him next, he must likewise suspend the
shaping of his personality."37 This stability must carry into the
child's relationships and surroundings. The Montana supreme court
29. Cleverly v. Stone, supra note 26 at 654; Foster and Freed, Child Custody (pt.1), 39
N.Y.U.L. REV. 423, 427-434 (1964) [hereinafter cited as Foster (pt.1)].
30. R.C.M. 1947, § 48-332; Trudgeon v. Trudgeon, supra note 10 at 228.
31. R.C.M. 1947, § 61-105.
32. In Re Biery, supra note 14 at 1378; Haynes v. Fillner, 106 Mont. 59, 75 P.2d 802,
808 (1938).
33. R.C.M. 1947, § 91-4515(2) (repealed, effective July 1, 1975, Laws of Montana (1974),
ch. 365, § 2.)
34. Foster (pt.1), supra note 29 at 437, 441.
35. Podell, supra note 3 at 53.
36. Id. at 68; Foster (pt.2), supra note 10 at 615.
37. Watson, supra note 1 at 64.
[Vol. 37
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recognized this important need for stability in the Gilmore and
Biery decisions2
In a custody proceeding, often the only data a court has, by
which to predict the outcome of a new court-imposed relationship,
is the past history of the parents' and child's interrelationship.
Requiring investigation into the physical and emotional needs of the
parents and child is a relatively new concept. The court cannot force
a parent and child into a harmonious relationship, but can only
recognize a potentially good relationship and provide an opportun-
ity for it to grow. To cut short this opportunity for growth may
seriously damage the child's development.
Because the court in custody proceedings has continuing
jurisdiction, a child's placement is never really finalized. In the
past, this lack of finality invited custody challenges from a disap-
pointed non-custodial parent and ultimately conflicted with the
child's need for stability. The Montana court recognized the need
to curtail litigation of this kind to prevent harrassment," but failed
to establish clear limits. Experts have concluded that to prevent
continued custody fights, courts should have the time and resources
to make a good decision on child placement. Once made, the deci-
sion should be difficult, if not impossible, to change."
The Montana UMDA adopted this philosophy. If a parent so
requests, the court may order an investigation of the child's cus-
todial arrangements, which may include referring the child to pro-
fessional personnel for medical and psychiatric examination to
assess the child's needs.4 To prevent continual litigation over cus-
tody decrees, the UMDA also makes modification of custody decrees
more difficult to obtain than under former law. No petition for
modification may be entertained by the court within two years of
the original decree except on a showing of exceptional circumstan-
ces-that there is reason to believe that the child's present environ-
ment may seriously endanger his physical, mental, moral, or emo-
tional health.2
The determination of the best interests of the child is unique
to each case. Former statutory and case law presumptions have not
allowed thorough analysis of the child's needs in relation to his
circumstances. This inadequate analysis has emphasized the need
for expert evaluation. The welfare of the child is best served by a
38. Gilmore v. Gilmore, supra note 4 at 482; In Re Biery, supra note 14 at 1378.
39. Bayers v. Bayers, supra note 8 at 509.
40. J. GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUND, and A. SoLNrr, BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD,
37 (1973); Watson, supra note 1 at 76.
41. R.C.M. 1947, § 48-335(2).
42. R.C.M. 1947, § 48-339.
19761
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placement which provides stability in the child's life and an oppor-
tunity for the development of continuing relationships. This should
be the primary concern of the courts.
C. The Role of the District Court
In Montana, under the UMDA, as under former law, the dis-
trict court does not lose jurisdiction over the parties in regard to
custody matters after the divorce decree has been granted." Child
custody orders are interlocutory in nature and, as such, are always
subject to review.
The district court judge, in determining the best interests of the
child, must follow the guidelines set out above." In so doing, the
judge is not bound by any contract regarding custody arrangements
made between the contesting parties either before or at the time of
the divorce. The judge, in his own discretion, has the duty to make
this determination.4 5
The supreme court has recognized the delicate nature of mak-
ing such a decision in a child custody proceeding, and the superior
advantage of the trial judge in evaluating the oral testimony of the
parties and other witnesses. 6 Because of this advantage, the su-
preme court holds that custody orders will not be disturbed on ap-
peal unless there is a strong showing that the trial judge abused his
discretion. Absent such a showing, the supreme court presumes the
trial judge was correct in his decision. 7
III. CONCLUSION
The Gilmore decision reaffirmed the guidelines for deciding
petitions for modification of child custody decrees: there must be a
substantial change in circumstances from the time the previous
order was entered; the court must look to the facts and circumstan-
ces of each case; the substantial change in circumstances must be
measured against the child's welfare rather than the parents' wel-
fare; and the best interests of the child are the paramount concern
of the court. But Gilmore also added strength to a newly developed
factor in applying those guidelines-that in determining the best
43. R.C.M. 1947, §§ 48-331, 48-333, 48-338, 48-339; R.C.M. 1947, § 21-138 (repealed,
LAWS OF MONTANA (1975), ch. 536, § 45); Barbour v. Barbour, 134 Mont. 317, 330 P.2d 1093,
1095 (1958).
44. Simon v. Simon, supra note 10 at 854; Anderson v. Anderson, 145 Mont. 244, 400
P.2d 632, 634 (1965).
45. Kane v. Kane, 53 Mont. 519, 165 P. 457, 459 (1917); CLARK, supra note 19 at 598.
46. Campbell v. Campbell, 126 Mont. 118, 245 P.2d 847, 849 (1952); Jewett v. Jewett,
73 Mont. 591, 237 P. 702, 703 (1925).
47. Trudgeon v. Trudgeon, supra note 10 at 226; In Re Bourquin, supra note 24 at 251.
[Vol. 37
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interests of the child, the court must recognize the need for stability
in a child's life. The Montana UMDA has codified this requirement
by providing that the court may not entertain a petition for modifi-
cation within two years of the previous decree except upon a show-
ing of exceptional circumstances. Where a satisfying relationship
already exists between the child and the custodial parent, be it
father or mother, the court should be very reluctant to break those
ties. Following these principles insures a more thoughtful analysis
of the child's needs, and avoids problems inherent in allowing legal
presumptions to determine custody decisions.
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